Copper Miners ETF Report | August 2026

Copper Miners ETF Key Takeaways

Copper prices continued to advance in July, extending a rally that has increasingly diverged from the traditional industrial cycle. Copper ended the month at $13,836 per metric ton, gaining +3.65% in July and +11.10% year-to-date.[1] A weaker U.S. dollar and persistent concerns over global mine supply helped support copper’s move. The U.S. copper premium also climbed back above 3%, reflecting continued positioning ahead of a potential tariff on refined copper imports.[2]

Copper’s strength is particularly notable against an uneven economic backdrop. Chinese demand indicators remain mixed, elevated prices have pressured some fabricators, and broader industrial activity has not provided an obvious cyclical catalyst. Yet copper continues to be one of the better-performing commodities.[3] We believe this resilience reflects a structural shift in copper’s demand profile, with consumption increasingly driven not only by construction, manufacturing and consumer activity, but also by electricity networks, AI data centres, defence systems and energy infrastructure. These sources of demand are supported by government policy, national security priorities and long-term infrastructure investment, making them generally less sensitive to short-term economic conditions.

At the same time, supply constraints are emerging across multiple stages of the copper value chain. Mine production continues to underperform expectations, exceptionally low treatment charges (TCs; the fees mining companies pay smelters to process copper concentrate into refined metal) point to an acute shortage of concentrate, and tariff uncertainty has redirected refined copper toward the U.S. No single factor fully explains copper’s move to record highs. Collectively, however, they underscore the limited flexibility within the global copper supply system as structural demand growth, constrained supply and policy disruptions increasingly converge.

Past performance is not indicative of future performance.

Looking at longer-term performance, copper miners (+110.43%) have outpaced broader equities (+83.10%) over the past five years.[4]

Demand for copper concentrate continued to intensify in July as mine supply became increasingly difficult to secure. Spot treatment charges fell to another all-time low, while Chilean copper miner Antofagasta plc shifted its mid-year copper sales from fixed terms, which had long served as an industry benchmark, to prices linked to the copper spot market.[5] Antofagasta’s contracting decisions matter because its terms have traditionally influenced pricing across much of the copper industry. Together, these developments suggest that concentrate is becoming increasingly scarce, bargaining power is shifting toward miners and long-standing industry practices are beginning to adjust to a tighter market.

For much of the copper industry’s history, large miners and smelters negotiated annual or mid-year benchmark treatment and refining charges (TC/RCs). Once a leading producer and smelter reached an agreement, other market participants frequently adopted similar terms, providing greater pricing certainty across the industry.

Antofagasta has become the de facto leader on the mining side of these negotiations in recent years. Its move toward spot-index-linked pricing is therefore more significant than an isolated contract between a miner and a smelter. If similar arrangements become more common, they could weaken the traditional benchmark system and expose a larger share of the industry directly to prevailing concentrate scarcity. BHP, the world’s largest copper producer in 2025, has already priced substantial volumes of concentrate against spot indexes.[6]

TC/RCs provide an important measure of the balance between concentrate supply and smelting capacity. When concentrate is abundant, smelters can charge miners more to process it. When concentrate becomes scarce, smelters must offer miners increasingly favourable terms to secure enough material to keep their facilities operating. Negative TC/RCs therefore indicate that the value of concentrate has risen significantly relative to refined copper.

The move from above $90 per metric ton in late 2023 to below -$150 today represents a reversal of more than $240 per metric ton. This extraordinary shift illustrates how decisively bargaining power has moved toward miners and provides a clearer indication of upstream scarcity than record-high refined copper prices alone.[7]

Given deeply negative treatment charges, an important question is why smelters have not responded by reducing production. Treatment charges have historically been an important source of smelter revenue, but they are only one component of a more complex earnings model. Smelters can also generate revenue from sulphuric acid produced during processing, payable and recoverable by-products such as gold and silver, copper recovered above contracted payable levels, cathode premiums and downstream products such as wire rod and tubing.

Sulphuric acid has been particularly important in sustaining smelter demand for concentrate. The Iran war disrupted trade from the Middle East, a region responsible for nearly half of global sulphur trade, while China’s suspension of sulphuric acid exports further tightened availability outside the country. Higher acid prices have had opposing effects across the copper supply chain: increasing costs and supply risks for acid-dependent solvent extraction and electrowinning mines while improving the economics of smelters that produce sulphuric acid as a valuable by-product.

Combined with elevated gold and silver prices, these revenues have allowed many smelters to remain profitable and continue competing aggressively for scarce concentrate despite deeply negative TC/RCs. This has delayed the production cuts that might otherwise have reduced competition for concentrate and allowed treatment charges to recover.

For copper miners, the result is particularly favourable. Smelters are offering increasingly attractive terms to secure scarce concentrate at the same time that refined copper prices are near record highs. Together, these conditions have pushed copper miners’ all-in sustaining cost margins to levels not seen in decades.

The resulting margin expansion highlights the operating leverage available to copper miners. Once a mine’s operating costs are covered, higher copper prices can flow disproportionately into earnings and cash flow. This leverage has historically allowed copper miners to outperform the metal during sustained bull markets, particularly when higher prices coincide with favourable concentrate terms and strong by-product revenues, as they do today.

We believe pure-play copper miners provide more direct exposure to copper’s constrained supply response and the resulting margin expansion, positioning them to benefit disproportionately if these conditions persist.

The possibility of U.S. tariffs on refined copper has redirected significant volumes of metal into the country, creating a historically large domestic stockpile. In 2025, the U.S. Commerce Department recommended a universal tariff of 15% beginning January 1, 2027, rising to 30% on January 1, 2028.[8] Although the Trump administration separately imposed a 50% tariff on semi-finished copper products,[9] it did not immediately adopt the recommendation for refined copper, leaving the market uncertain about whether—and at what rate—imports might eventually be taxed.

That uncertainty created a powerful incentive to move copper into the U.S. before any tariff took effect. Copper already inside the country could become considerably more valuable if future imports were taxed, supporting a premium for U.S. copper over metal traded on the London Metal Exchange (LME). When that premium was sufficient to cover freight, financing and storage costs, traders could profitably purchase copper abroad and deliver it to U.S. ports and warehouses.

The resulting inventory shift has been extraordinary. More than 200,000 metric tons of refined copper arrived at U.S. ports in July, the largest monthly inflow in data extending back to 2014.[10]

The U.S. Commerce Department was expected to complete its Section 232 review by June 30, 2026, but no public decision followed. The market must therefore continue to weigh several potential outcomes, including the original phased tariff, a lower rate with exemptions or another delay. Each carries different implications for the value of copper already accumulated in the U.S.

Under normal conditions, COMEX copper trades at only a modest premium to LME copper. That changed dramatically in July 2025, when President Trump’s comments regarding a 50% copper tariff led traders to believe the levy could include refined copper, pushing the COMEX premium above 28%. The premium collapsed after refined copper was excluded but has recently begun to rebuild, rising above 3% as the market again prices in the possibility of future tariffs.[11]

Copper already held inside the U.S. therefore retains valuable optionality. If a tariff is ultimately imposed, those inventories could become more valuable relative to copper outside the country. As long as policy remains unresolved, that possibility reduces the incentive to return metal to international markets.

The U.S. stockpile has been built at the expense of availability elsewhere. Copper shipped to the U.S. has been diverted from other consuming regions, contributing to a sharp decline in available LME inventories.[12] Nearby LME contracts have moved further into backwardation, indicating that copper available for immediate delivery is commanding a premium over future supply. Chinese buyers are also competing more aggressively for metal while domestic exchange inventories remain low.

Some copper may eventually return to international markets as trade flows normalise. But policy clarity cannot increase mine production, reverse declining ore grades or accelerate projects that can take more than a decade to develop. U.S. tariff uncertainty has amplified and regionalised copper’s tightness, but it has not created the underlying scarcity of mined copper.

Chile lowered its copper production forecasts after first-half output fell to its lowest level since 2018. The world’s largest copper-producing country now expects output to decline in 2026 before recovering next year, with both forecasts reduced meaningfully from prior estimates. At a time when smelters are already struggling to secure concentrate, the loss of expected supply from Chile further tightens the upstream market.[13]

The weakness reflects more than temporary maintenance or operational disruptions. Much of Chile’s major copper capacity was developed decades ago, and key operations are contending with declining ore grades, aging infrastructure, water constraints and increasingly complex investment requirements. National production remains below its 2018 peak and would still fall short of that level even if the revised recovery forecast is achieved.[14]

These challenges extend well beyond Chile. Mine disruptions exceeded their long-term average in both 2024 and 2025, while recoveries at major operations, including Grasberg and Kamoa-Kakula, have taken longer than expected. The market needs Chilean production to recover, disrupted mines to return and operating performance elsewhere to normalise simply to deliver the supply already embedded in forecasts.

Higher copper prices should encourage investment, but major mines can take 15 to 20 years to develop and require substantial capital. Much of the visible project pipeline is also needed simply to replace declining production at existing operations before it can generate meaningful net supply growth. Record copper prices are sending the necessary investment signal, but the supply response remains years away.[15]

Macro Outlook

Copper enters the remainder of 2026 near record highs,[16] but the market has yet to deliver the supply response those prices are intended to encourage. The most important near-term test will be whether production begins to recover. The market is relying on improved output from Chile and the gradual restoration of major operations, including Grasberg and Kamoa-Kakula. These recoveries, though reduced from original expectations, are already embedded in supply forecasts, leaving limited room for further disappointment at a time when record-low treatment charges indicate that smelters are already struggling to secure enough concentrate.

Meanwhile, strategic demand continues to build. AI was not the principal driver of copper’s recent rally, but its rapid expansion is exposing the limitations of global power systems. Data centres can be built faster than the generation, substations and transmission systems needed to supply them, shifting the potential bottleneck from computing hardware toward electricity infrastructure. Copper demand extends well beyond the metal contained within data centres to the much larger power systems required to operate them.

China is already investing at scale. As an energy-dependent nation, China’s expansion of domestic generation and transmission is fundamentally an energy-security strategy, reducing exposure to imported fuels while supporting industrial and technological growth. The U.S. faces similar pressure to expand its power system as AI, advanced manufacturing and defence requirements collide with aging grids and limited connection capacity.

AI does not need to become copper’s largest end market to have a meaningful effect. Even incremental demand can materially tighten a market in which existing mine supply is already falling short and new production remains slow to deliver.

Copper’s record price should therefore be viewed as a signal that significant investment is still required. The market is already competing intensely for limited concentrate before the next phase of power-related demand has fully arrived. With strategic uses expanding faster than mine supply can keep pace, the copper market appears to be moving deeper into a multi-year period of structural tightness.

Short-term volatility is likely, but the longer-term balance is becoming increasingly supportive. Copper miners offer leverage to that imbalance because higher realised prices can flow disproportionately into margins and cash flow. As supply remains inelastic and strategic demand accelerates, copper and copper miners remain well positioned to benefit through the remainder of 2026 and beyond.

Copper Miners ETF Performance
As of 31.08.2026

CPPR (Fund)NSCOPEN (Index)
1M16.91%16.91%
3M5.22%5.30%
6M-0.11%0.00%
YTD25.17%25.35%
12M86.03%84.43%
3Y-184.63%
Since Inception (06/12/2023)221.05%218.74%


Source: Bloomberg / HANetf. Data as of 31.08.2026. Please note that all performance figures are showing net data. Past performance for the index is in USD. Past performance is not an indicator for future results and should not be the sole factor of consideration when selecting a product. Investors should read the prospectus of the Issuer (“Prospectus”) before investing and should refer to the section of the Prospectus entitled ‘Risk Factors’ for further details of risks associated with an investment in this product. When you invest in ETFs and ETCs, your capital is at risk.

[1] Source: Bloomberg. Data as of 31.07.2026

[2] https://sprott.com/insights/copper-at-record-highs-structural-demand-meets-constrained-supply/

[3] https://tradingeconomics.com/commodities

[4] Source: Bloomberg. Data as of 31.07.2026

[5] https://www.mining.com/web/antofagasta-agrees-spot-indexed-copper-ore-sales-with-some-chinese-smelters-smm-says/

[6] Source: S&P Capital IQ, 2026

[7] Source: Bloomberg. Data as of 31.07.2026

[8] https://www.cnbc.com/2026/08/14/copper-trump-tariffs-metal-commodities-trade-war.html

[9] https://credendo.com/en/knowledge-hub/copper-sector-us-copper-prices-fall-trumps-tariffs-exclude-raw-and-refined-copper

[10] Bloomberg and HIS Markit. Copper Tariff Delay Raises Repricing Risk: Macro View.

[11] https://sprott.com/insights/copper-at-record-highs-structural-demand-meets-constrained-supply/

[12] https://www.lme.com/market-data/reports-and-data/warehouse-and-stocks-reports/stocks-summary

[13] https://www.mining-journal.com/base-metals/news-analysis/4535195/chile-lowest-half-copper-output-2018

[14] https://sprott.com/insights/copper-at-record-highs-structural-demand-meets-constrained-supply/

[15] https://www.miningvisuals.com/post/copper-mines-average-time-from-discovery-to-production-is-17-9-years

[16] https://tradingeconomics.com/commodity/copper

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